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The power grid is facing increasing risks from a cybersecurity attack. Attacks that shut 
off electricity in Ukraine have already occurred, and successful compromises of the power grid 
that did not shut off electricity to customers have been privately disclosed in North America. The 
objective of this study is to identify how perceptions of various factors emphasized in the electric 
sector affect incident response planning.  Methods used include a survey of 229 power grid 
personnel and the use of partial least squares structural equation modeling to identify causal 
relationships.  This study reveals the relationships between perceptions by personnel responsible 
for cybersecurity, regarding incident response exercises, information sharing, and situational 
awareness, and incident response planning.  The results confirm that the efforts by the industry 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
As demonstrated by recent attacks, the electric sector faces an increasing risk of 
disruption of services to end customers.  As electricity is a core critical infrastructure for modern 
society, this risk goes beyond just the businesses and threatens the general public.  The industry 
has set requirements to manage an incident successfully and to prepare for attacks against the 
bulk electric system (NERC, 2019c).  Not only does the industry recognize the importance of 
this preparation, but North American governments recognize this need.  Further, books such as 
Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath (Koppel, 2015) raised 
awareness across the general public.   
Addressing the threat of a massive cybersecurity incident in the power grid is complex.  
As of 2015, there are about 16,000 transmission substations, 7,098 high voltage transmission 
lines, and 1,057 gigawatts of generation serving 334 million customers in the interconnected 
power systems that make up the North American power grid.  This grid includes the mainland 
U.S., portions of Canada, and portions of Baja California in Mexico (NERC, 2016c).  These 
totals do not include local distribution power lines and substations.   
No cybersecurity attacks since 2014 have resulted in a loss of power supply (loss of load) 
to any customer in the North American power grid (NERC, 2016f, 2019d).  However, 
cyberattacks that resulted in loss of load occurred on two occasions in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 
(Assante, Conway, Lee, & E-ISAC, 2016; Assante, Conway, Lee, & E-ISAC, 2017).  Further, 
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there are reports that the Russian hacking group, variously identified as Dragonfly or Energetic 
Bear, has obtained access within the power grid to the point they could have thrown the switches 
(Smith, 2018).  
A successful large scale cyberattack could have an impact similar to the 2003 Northeast 
Blackout, which lasted four days and cost the economy between $4 billion and $10 billion 
(Knake, 2017).  With a widespread interconnected power grid controlled by thousands of 
companies (NERC, 2019b), the attack surface is too widespread to prevent every cyberattack.  
While most cybersecurity incidents are likely to be much smaller, the ability to respond to and 
recover from a cybersecurity incident is mandatory.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
The electric sector has focused on a variety of issues related to cybersecurity incident 
response, primarily through the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).  The 
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) has focused on various issues 
including information sharing and situational awareness (Diebold et al., 2013; E-ISAC, 2018), 
mandatory incident response planning (NERC, 2019c), and large scale incident response 
exercises (NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d, 2018a).  Each of these components involves people who 
are receiving information, placing the information in context, and practicing incident response 
skills.  Incident response is dependent on each of these skills to manage an incident.  There is a 
clear need in the electric sector to understand how individuals perceive these topics and fit them 
together in preparation for a cybersecurity incident. 
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1.3 Research Goal and Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to develop a model that can explain the causal 
relationship between incident response exercise learning, information sharing quality, situational 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The power grid consists of three major domains: generation, transmission, and local 
distribution.  Each of these domains uses operational technologies (OT) and industrial control 
systems.  For example, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) are 
commonly used to open and close breakers that control the flow of power.  Generation plants use 
the same types of control systems that are used broadly in manufacturing.   
Planning is necessary before responding to an incident.  These plans also require 
appropriate testing before use.  The industry routinely develops plans for many types of events.  
In the 2008 to 2015 time period, nine of the ten most stressed days for the power grid we a result 
of weather (NERC, 2016f).  Not only do common large-scale incidents such as weather have 
carefully prepared plans, cybersecurity incident response planning is regulatory mandated across 
the bulk power systems (NERC, 2019c).  Further, these incident response plans are tested 
annually for critical portions of the power grid and once every three years for the remainder of 
the bulk electric system.  A large portion of the industry participates in a biennial continental 
exercise simulating a broad cyber and physical attack against the bulk electric system (NERC, 
2012, 2014, 2016d). 
Situational awareness weaknesses are not new to the electric sector.  The Northeast 
Blackout of 2003 included poor situational awareness and blindness to critical information as 
root causes (US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004).  To maintain shared 
situational awareness across the industry, NERC operates the Electricity Information Sharing and 
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Analysis Center (E-ISAC) for the sharing of information in support of situational awareness (E-
ISAC, 2018).  
2.1 Cyberattacks in the Electric and Energy Sectors 
Cyberattacks have been rare in the electric sector, with only two known attacks occurring 
in Ukraine that directly disrupted electrical services to customers, also referred to as loss of load.  
However, there have been attacks elsewhere in the energy sector and in other industrial sectors 
that use similar systems. 
An early incident occurred in 2003 when the SQL Slammer worm infected the safety 
system at the Davis-Besse Nuclear power plant. The worm passed from a contractor’s network 
through the business network at the plant and into the plant control systems network, where it 
crashed safety monitoring systems.  The power plant was offline at the time of the attack (Nicol, 
2011).  Unlike many of the later attacks, this was a side effect of a poorly protected system and a 
random internet worm.  
The first widely known attack was the famous Stuxnet attack discovered in 2010 that was 
performed by the U.S. and Israel against the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz.  The 
attack was performed by a contractor that supported the air-gapped Siemens control system used 
at the facility.  The system went beyond basic protections by air-gapping the entire control 
system from the internet and other internal connections (Zetter & 3M Company, 2014).   
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A 2014 report discussed a German steel mill that sustained massive damage, killed two 
persons, and injured 13 others.  The attack is the first known example after the Stuxnet attack 
against a control system that caused physical damage.  The attack methodology included 
phishing of employees to gain entry, compromising a host on the corporate network, moved into 
the control system network, and then performance of the damaging attack (Lee, Assante, & 
Conway, 2014).  Private discussions indicate that there have been other similar unpublished 
attacks.  Each of these attacks follows the ideas adapted from the military in 2011, known as the 
Lockheed Martin® Cyber Kill Chain (Assante & Lee, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015). The 
motivations for these attacks are unknown. 
Two successful attacks in 2015 and 2016 against the Ukraine power grid resulted in loss 
of electrical service to customers, the only known times that cyberattacks have disrupted 
electrical service.  In 2015, approximately 225,000 customers lost power and as a result of a 
carefully targeted cyberattack against three power distribution companies in Ukraine.  The attack 
path followed the cyber kill chain and partially made use of the BlackEnergy2 tool that was 
specifically targeting a control system.  Additional supporting techniques enhanced the 
effectiveness of the attack including electronically destroying (“bricking”) communications 
equipment to the attacked substations, attacks that took control of UPS in the control centers, 
denial of service attacks against the phone systems, and formatting the hard drives inside the 
control systems (Assante et al., 2016; Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2016; Zetter, 
2016).  Private conversations with members of the investigation team that visited the Ukraine 
indicate that other industrial sectors had been prepared for an attack, but the attack was not 
executed.  Later analysis by Dragos® indicates the attack had intentions of causing more 
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prolonged outages, but an attack against the relays that would have allowed the destruction of 
breakers when re-energizing the equipment failed (Greenberg, 2019).  The 2016 attack took 
some of the ideas from 2015 and automated the attack by building a framework to carry out 
those attacks using a tool that has been dubbed CrashOverride by Dragos® and Industroyer by 
ESET®.  This attack power disrupted generation in the capital region in Ukraine and disrupted 
200 megawatts of transmission (Assante et al., 2017; Cherepanov & Lipovsky, 2017; 
Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2017a; Dragos, 2017) . 
In 2017, attacks continued against the energy sector, the electric sector, and nuclear 
power, in the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign using the Havex malware.  The attack followed the above 
kill chain. (Symantec, 2017; Venkatachary, Prasad, & Samikannu, 2018).  No destructive attacks 
occurred as a result of this campaign.  In 2018 the Department of Homeland Security CISA team 
released an alert and briefed the industry in a set of non-public calls that the attackers had direct 
access to the control systems(Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2018).  However, that 
view was challenged by industry leaders during a meeting with Secretary of Homeland Security 
Nielsen and the Secretary of Energy Perry, where they stated the intrusion was limited to one or 
two wind turbine sites (Sobczak, 2018).  That meeting also included information that the attack 
was discovered by the Department of Energy’s Cyber Risk Information Sharing Program 
(CRISP), which includes a set of sensors that monitors internet traffic into many of the large 
power companies (Department of Energy, 2018).   
While any attack against a control system can be dangerous, attacks are now targeting 
safety systems inside of production facilities.  The Trisis attack (a.k.a. Tricon, Hatman) against 
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the Schneider Triconex® safety instrumentation system disrupted a Saudi Arabian petrochemical 
facility.  This type of attack can be used to place a targeted facility in an unsafe condition and 
potentially threaten the general public (Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2017b).    
While public impact has so far been minimal, capabilities have advanced from random 
events, through Stuxnet as the first highly targeted control system attack, continuing through 
BlackEnergy 2 used maliciously against the power grid, further advancing to CrashOverride 
automating the attack, and then finally the Trisis attacking emergency shutdowns for safety 
systems.  Whether the motivation is criminal profit, hacktivism to make a statement, or by 
countries to gain a political or military advantage, the attacks will become more capable.  An 
extended power outage may be the desired outcome or just the side effect.  Either way, when 
protection fails, the ability to effectively respond to a cyberattack is mandatory. 
2.2 Electricity Sector Cybersecurity Regulatory Requirements 
While distribution is locally regulated, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) regulates the bulk power system.  However, the responsibility for developing the 
regulations is assigned to, and enforcement is shared with the industry through the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) under section 215 of the Federal Power Act.  
NERC grew up as an industry organization following the 1967 blackout that affected the 
northeast United States and eastern Canada (NERC, 2016e) and continues to play multiple roles 
as an enforcement body, developer of regulatory standards for the reliability and security of the 
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power grid, and as the reliability coordinator for the industry. All bulk generation and 
transmission owners are mandated to become a member of NERC by the Federal Power Act.   
Bulk power system transmission substations, generation stations, and control centers are 
required to have and test a documented incident response plan. Standard CIP-008-5 for high and 
medium impact systems or CIP-003-6 for low impact assets mandates incident response plans 
(NERC, 2019c).   These rules have been approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in Orders 791and 822. (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2013, 2016).  
Canada generally adopts NERC standards and enforces these standards on a provincial basis 
(NERC, 2017). Additional requirements are continually in development. 
2.3 Cybersecurity Incident Response Planning 
Both power grid operators and the information technology industry have developed 
strong incident management skills.  The power grid developed these skills because of significant 
natural events such as earthquakes, ice storms, hurricanes, and various power grid cascading 
failures.  The computer security profession has formalized incident response standards.   
2.3.1 Managing Events: Risk vs. Resilience 
When considering cyberattacks, risk and resilience have slightly different meanings.  
Both are relevant to having an incident response process.  Risk is defined by the likelihood and 
impact of an attack, whereas resiliency refers to the ability to continue operating during an attack 
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and return to the normal state following the attack (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2012).  Based on these definitions, risk assessment is performed to ensure the 
proper protections are in place before an attack occurs.  Resilience needs to be designed into the 
system to ensure that it can continue operating.   
Risk assessment in the electric sector is mandated in the Reliability Standards for the 
Bulk Electric System of North America in standard CIP-002-5.1 (NERC, 2019c).  The analysis 
performed here defines minimum cybersecurity requirements for the power grid based on this 
risk.  However, this standard only considers the impact on simplifying the analysis process.   
While standardized to define the needed protections, this view of risk reflects neither the 
evolving infrastructure used in power grid control systems nor the evolving capabilities of the 
attacker. 
Cybersecurity resilience also receives significant attention in the electric sector.  For 
example, both the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee’s studies by the Cyber 
Attack Task Force and the Severe Impact Resilience Task Force considers resilience.   As the 
North American power grid has a long history of dealing with “normal” emergencies such as 
weather events, resilience is not a new concept.  However, following a severe event that causes 
massive damage, a “new normal” with degraded planning and operating conditions will be 
established that could last for months or years.  In response to these events, operational 
parameters such as islanding portions of the power grid, changes to system operating parameters 
and protections systems, and degradation of communications may occur.  The Cyber Attack Task 
Force focused on a prevent, detect, respond, recover model.  The Severe Impact Resilience Task 
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Force focused on preparing the operational components for a severe event such as an attack or 
geomagnetic disturbance. This team considered topics such as system operations, monitoring 
communications, and planning during a major event (Abell et al., 2012; Bowe et al., 2012).      
2.3.2 Cybersecurity Incident Response Handling  
Cybersecurity incident response handling is a mature field from a process perspective.  
While the specific attacks and associated responses vary widely, the overall approach is well 
understood.  NIST SP 800-61 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide defines a computer 
security incident as “a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices” (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 
2012).  
Numerous incident response planning guides have been published (Tøndel, Line, & 
Jaatun, 2014).  In addition to NIST SP 800-61 published in the U.S. (Cichonski et al., 2012),  
The European Network and Information Security Agency publishes Good Practice Guide for 
Incident Management (Maj, Reijers, & Stikvoort, 2010).  ISO/IEC 27035 is also a widely used 
international standard (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], 2016).  Numerous 
other organizations, such as SANS (Kral, 2011), publish guidance.  While there are definite 
differences in the details of these guides, they all emphasize the same concepts. 
Incident response guidelines that focus on information technology and industrial control 




Industrial control system (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types 
of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system 
configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 
often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures.  (Stouffer, 
Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams, & Hahn, 2015) 
Industrial control systems (ICS) operate in a real-time environment, such as the power 
grid.  As ICS controls physical equipment, incidents may not only result in production and 
service interruptions but present a risk to humans and the environment.  Further, physical attacks 
on this equipment often can have a considerable impact.  While the implementation of parts of 
the plan is different, the overall flow of incident response remains similar.   
Table 1 identifies the overall process flows for several conventional processes and the 
NERC defined process.  It highlights the similarities and differences between processes. 









1. Plan and prepare 1. Preparation  1. Preparation 
2. Detection and 
reporting 
2. Detection and 
Analysis 
1. Detection 2. Identification 
2. Triage 
3. Assessment and 
decision 
 3. Analysis  
4. Responses 3. Containment, 
Eradication, and 
Recovery 
4. Response 3. Containment 
4. Eradication 
5. Recovery 
5. Lessons learned 4. Post-Incident 
Activity 




 NIST has identified an overall cybersecurity framework for critical infrastructure 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2018).  This framework identifies five 
functions that assist in preventing and responding to an attack with specific functions within each 
category and subcategories that identify the details of the model.  While the identify, protect, and 
detect processes occur continuously, actual events trigger response and recovery.  In the industry, 
the phrase “stay left of boom” focuses on prevention, while being prepared to deal with boom 
once it occurs.  
Adapted from NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  
Figure 1 Preventing and Managing an Attack  
2.3.3 Incident Response Handling Structure 
While a small event can often be quickly handled using these approaches, a larger scale 
event requires a generalized incident response protocol.  Both physical and electronic damage 
may be present and impact the public.     
The U.S. Government, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has 
developed an incident response standard widely used by first responders in many other types of 
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events.  This process is known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  Due to the 
close tie between the electricity sector and various North American federal and state government 
agencies, an understanding of this program provides a planning approach (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008).   
 The NIMS core process document includes specific information on the communication of 
information between different parties within the team.  NIMS refers to a common operating 
picture that “is established and maintained by gathering, collating, synthesizing, and 
disseminating incident information to all appropriate parties.”  This understanding allows an 
understanding of available resources, requests, and priorities.  The communications 
infrastructure focuses on interoperability, reliability, scalability, and resiliency. 
 A standardized format for information sharing ensures situational awareness.  
Maintaining communication begins with incident notification and continues through status 
reports in an easy to analyze format.  Further, tracking this information allows a stronger after-
action review.  Of course, not everything will easily fit into the standard reporting format, and 
information will need to be available in the best manner to present the information.  Clarity is 
more important than perfection when reporting and using information.  Timely information is 
often more critical than complete information. The last little bit of perfection adds little to the 
decision-makers' ability to decide.  Finally, the exchange of information needs to be 
appropriately secured.  Through this, NIMS demonstrates a preplanned incident response system 

















General Staff Command Staff
Adapted from DHS FEMA National Incident Management System 2008 
 
Figure 2 NIMS Incident Command Structure (Department of Homeland Security, 2008) 
2.3.4 Cybersecurity Incident Response Team Effectiveness 
Incident response is dependent on the integrated skills and capability of the cybersecurity 
incident response team.  The Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute summarizes 
several factors that affect response in the closing remarks of their Handbook for Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs).  As is true for security in general, the needs of 
each CSIRT are unique, and the CSIRT environment is dynamic. There is no chance of long-
term stability, since technology, the constituency base, and the intruder community can change 
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any time. To ensure successful operation, a CSIRT must have the ability to adapt to the changing 
needs of the environment and exhibit the flexibility to deal with the unexpected. In addition, a 
CSIRT must simultaneously address funding issues and organizational changes that can affect its 
ability to either adapt to the needs or provide the service itself. (West-Brown, Stikvoort, 
Kossakowski, Killcrece, & Ruefle, 2003)    
2.3.5 An Incident Response Case Study: Gulf Oil Spill 
These ideas are not unique to the electric sector.  A real-world case study of an event in 
the Gulf of Mexico documents the practical implementation of incident response in the physical 
world. This document highlights the response in terms of strategy, tactics, and operational 
processes.  The strategic level identifies the goals and determines the overall actions, which are 
set by the incident manager and supporting team.  During the incident, the planning team 
identified the specific activities to be taken with adequate detail to carry the plan out.  The 
operational team then carries out this plan.   
Limited or inadequate information challenges response teams early in the process.  Often, 
the first part of the process focuses on the tactical viewpoint and may be performed based on pre-
planning and rule-based analysis.  Typically, time and risk factors are most critical early in the 
process.  Changing conditions will typically be seen, requiring personnel to adapt to the 
environment rapidly. As the process continues, the strategic actions gain importance (Crichton, 
Lauche, & Flin, 2005). 
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As demonstrated in this case study, there are three levels of decisions needed during a 
security event.  Decisions occur at the real-time or operational level, the tactical level, and at a 
strategic level.   
2.3.6 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain 
Managing the attack requires a detailed understanding of the events to see how the attack 
occurs.  A cyber kill chain, commercially developed by Lockheed Martin (Lockheed Martin, 
2015), evaluates the processes an attacker uses to break in and cause damage.  Assante and Lee 
(2015) extend this approach to industrial control systems.  Based on private discussions with 
members of E-ISAC and others in the industry, many in the electric sector have adopted this 
approach. 
There are two stages to this kill chain.  Intrusion into the network occurs in the first stage.  
Developing and performing the attack on control system equipment occurs during the second 
stage.  Cyber kill chain theory posits that the attack disruption may occur at any point in the kill 
chain.  Figure 3 shows the individual steps typically used by the adversary.  The highlighted 
steps are observable by the defender and present an opportunity to disrupt the attack.  The further 
into the attack, the more difficult it is for the attacker to proceed without detection.  The Stuxnet 




Figure 3 ICS Cyber Kill Chain (Assante & Lee, 2015)  
The December 2015 Ukraine cyberattack also followed this approach (Assante et al., 
2016).  While the approach is straightforward, it effectively identifies opportunities to disrupt the 
attacks. 
2.4 Situational Awareness  
Early situational awareness research evolved from military and aircraft operations, with 
Mica Endsley widely published and cited in this research.  She defines situational awareness as: 
Situation Awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection 
of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1995).   
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2.4.1 Importance of Situational Awareness in the Bulk Power System 
After the 2003 U.S. and Canada blackout affecting 50 million people and 61,800 MW of 
electric load, the U.S. and Canadian Task Force identified three groups of causes for the blackout 
directly related to situational awareness including (US-Canada Power System Outage Task 
Force, 2004):  
• “FirstEnergy and ECAR failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of FE’s 
system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of 
the Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with appropriate 
voltage criteria.” 
• “Inadequate situational awareness at FirstEnergy. FE did not recognize or 
understand the deteriorating condition of its system.” 
• “Failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide effective 
real-time diagnostic support.” 
Since this report, the industry has focused on real-time situational awareness and understanding 
within power grid operations.  
2.4.2 Situational Awareness Overview 
Endsley, in 2012 and 2013, presented an overview of situational awareness in the bulk 
power system at the NERC Human Performance Conference in 2012 and expanded the idea in a 
related journal article (Connors, Endsley, & Jones, 2007; Endsley, 2012).  In the overview, 
Endsley highlighted the relationship between awareness and understanding in terms of 
perception of the current state, comprehension of this state, and projection of the potential future 
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state. Figure 4 places this in terms of “what,” “so what,” and “now what.”  Situational awareness 
provides the information for decision-making in the environment using this approach.   
Situational Awareness
What So What Now What
Adapted from M. Endsley, SA Technologies, 2012
What Do I Need?
Perception





Figure 4 Situational Awareness (Endsley, 2012) 
While the approach currently focuses on real-time decision-making concerning power 
grid operations, it also provides a useful basis for power grid cybersecurity.  Perception begins 
with the detection of something interesting happening on the network.  Once the information 
becomes available, possibly through automated alerts or an analyst’s recognition of events, 
additional information allows the formation of a mental model of the event.  Perception then 
evolves into comprehension of the current state of the event.  Once attaining comprehension, 
analysts can finally project potential impacts (D'Amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien, & Roth, 
2005).   
When the analyst has the right information for situational awareness, the analyst has the 
tools to utilize the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) model (Blasch et al., 2009).  This 
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approach combines both real-time and tactical information for the commander of an incident to 
make intuitive decisions under stress.  Steps int OODA model includes:   
• Observe the current incident and understand the threat 
• Orient to the threat and understand alternatives and project the impact of various 
alternatives 
• Decide among the options to select a response based on available information 
• Act on the decision while continuing to make new observations 
In addition to real-time situational awareness, tactical situational understanding also 
provides value when evaluating alternatives and opportunities. In essence, real-time situational 
awareness focuses on the immediate here and now. Tactical situational understanding orients the 
decision-maker to assess the environment and mission requirements. 
One study identified six recommendations for incident command system design (Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001). Of specific interest is the recommendation “Institute protocols for mental model 
development and maintenance.”  The authors suggest several questions that can be adapted to 
cybersecurity events to obtain this shared mental model. 
• “How much attention should be directed to situational comprehension?”  
• “When and how should individuals initiate mental model development?”  
• “What communication protocols would insure (sic) effective dissemination of 
information critical to mental models?”  
• “How can representational responsibility be off-loaded?” 
 
Another study in an information security focused article identified three deficiencies in 
situational awareness of risk information in their literature review (Webb, Ahmad, Maynard, & 
Shanks, 2014).  First, risk identification is treated in a perfunctory manner.  The authors propose 
that a lack of risk management training by professionals performing the risk assessment process 
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results in a non-consideration of information sources.  They also propose that this review is 
treated more as a compliance requirement rather than using a granulated assessment.  Next, they 
highlight that the risk assessment does not consider the organization’s situation, but instead 
reflects the assessor’s speculation rather than the evidence.  Further, the assessment is often 
rendered as subjective numerical probability and risk values that do not consider the specific 
environment.  Finally, the authors find that information is gathered on an intermittent basis rather 
than on a scheduled basis.  As a result, the ability to analyze changes is limited.   
2.4.3 Shared Situational Awareness 
While the incident response commander leads the response, all participants need the 
appropriate information to make decisions consistent with the response. Essentially, there needs 
to be shared situational understanding around the event and the decisions made.  After creating a 
shared understanding, the individual may apply this information to their situational awareness for 
their immediate responsibilities.  Further, each individual’s observations also need to be shared.   
 While obtaining shared situational awareness is critical, the challenges are far more 
significant for dispersed teams.   Kaber and Endsley (1998), while reviewing shared situational 
awareness in process control systems, identified several barriers to achieving this awareness.  
Unavailable or low-quality information being collected and shared often results in weak 
situational awareness.  Further, information that would be valuable to other teams may not be 
shared.  The organizational culture and the capability to effectively share information are core to 
allowing this communication to happen.  Organizational instability impairs this organizational 
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culture.  Interpersonal conflicts, especially when the leader or another team member takes a 
dictatorial approach, impairs communication, and could result in decisions made for 
organizational cohesiveness rather than effectiveness.  The lack of a shared environment and 
supporting non-verbal communications in dispersed teams adds complexity to developing a 
consistent operating picture.   
One significant advantage the electric sector has is that E-ISAC operates as a central 
service for maintaining situational awareness.  While the large investor-owned utilities may have 
the resources to assign resources to monitor the risk environment, smaller entities such as the 
municipal utilities and cooperatives do not have the same resources available.  A centralized 
approach may be an appropriate approach as long as the collective situational awareness is 
shared.  
2.5 Information Sharing 
The ability to perform analysis is highly dependent on both the real-time information 
collected for both power grid operations and on the overall tactical cybersecurity status.   
2.5.1 Information Sharing and Shared Situational Awareness 
One study of command and control in a battlefield exercise identified that successful 
information sharing between command and control staff, each with their specific areas of 
expertise, permitted proactive actions during the battlefield exercise.  Three types of individual 
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information support information sharing: current work goal and situation, work process, and 
specialized domain knowledge.  The work process is related to the specific task procedures and 
informal practices.  The handoffs not only occur between teams but within teams during shift 
changes (Sonnenwald & Pierce, 2000). 
One of the challenges to obtaining shared situational awareness is sharing not just the 
right information, but the right amount of information to obtain a common operating picture.  
Information needs change as an incident evolves.  Timeliness, accuracy, and quality of the 
information evolves during the situation.  The real value is not the data, but the interpretation of 
the data (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). 
Information sharing between teams would seem simple using modern tools.  However, 
each individual has an individual goal to obtain.  People will often share information in a manner 
that helps them obtain their goal rather than the overall goal. As individuals determine personal 
goals, the results can be significantly changed by the planning and organizational structure that 
either rewards a positive information-sharing context or builds barriers to effective information 
sharing (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004).   
2.5.2 Information Sources 
The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) manages overall 
cybersecurity for the electricity sector.  E-ISAC is a NERC organization that coordinates with 
utilities and government agencies to collect and share security information and coordinates 
incident management across the sector (Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 
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2016a).  Overall, there are 21 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers for critical infrastructure 
that provide and collect information on cyber and physical security hazards (National Council of 
ISACs, 2016). 
E-ISAC provides a private portal with daily reports, industry discussions, and a private 
monthly web conference. These non-public briefings typically include current event information 
from E-ISAC analysts, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and ICS-CERT on current 
events.  Finally, events include the annual GridSecCon Power Grid Security Conference and 
quarterly updates provided to the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee.  For the 
program to be successful, organizations need to share information with E-ISAC (Electricity 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 2016b).   This information should also be shared with 
other appropriate resources. 
In addition to E-ISAC, there are numerous other information sources with many 
organized in coordination with the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.  Much of this information is general information security, though DHS 
maintains a specific Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).  
While information is often available, it comes from a wide variety of sources and takes 
significant work to coordinate.   
While the above techniques handle the vast majority of cyber and physical security 
information, critical information is occasionally escalated to the NERC alert level.  There are 
three levels of formal NERC alerts shown in Table 2 below (NERC, 2016a, 2016b).  The highest 
level of alert, an essential action, has never been used.   
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Table 2 NERC Alerts  
Alert Type Description Alerts issued 
since 2014 
Industry Advisory “Purely informational, intended to alert registered entities to issues or 




“Recommends specific action be taken by registered entities. A 
response from recipients, as defined in the alert, is required.” 
5 
Essential Action  “Identifies actions deemed to be “essential” to bulk power system 
reliability and requires NERC Board of Trustees' approval prior to 
issuance. Like recommendations, essential actions also require 
recipients to respond as defined in the alert.” 
0 
 
2.5.3 Information Sharing Complexities in the Electric Sector 
The NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee produced a report entitled 
Recommendations for Improved Information Sharing that highlights the complexity of 
communications and the number of resources available (Diebold et al., 2013).  The team 
highlighted seven agencies, 11 separate sources of documents, and nine sets of recipients that 
either request or require communication to occur.   
The amount of complexity involved stresses the processes and requires significant 
planning during an incident to ensure information is shared with the right agencies and 
organizations.  The report highlights the challenges in the following quote: 
The industry struggles to make correlations between information received from 
various information sources… Due to various requirements, industry must report 
the same or similar information to sources listed above. Having so many reporting 
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and information sources results in duplicative information, and important 
information can be overlooked. The industry needs a central hub for reporting 
suspicious physical and cyber-related events. Consolidated reporting will greatly 
enhance the analysis and detection of emerging threats. (Diebold et al., 2013) 
This report also identifies a sample of current information sources that need to be 
monitored and correlated, including: 
• NERC Standards Announcements  
• NERC Alerts  
• NERC Standards Interpretation Requests  
• DHS For Official Use Only  
• DOE Sector-Specific Agency Information  
• Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Alerts  
• United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Alerts  
• E-ISAC Notices  
• Vendor Notices  
• National Lab Research 
2.5.4 Information Sharing Metrics 
From the above research, information sharing and situational awareness are closely 
related. Effective information sharing supports good situational awareness, both before and 
during an event.  As demonstrated in the industry’s communication processes, information can 
be shared widely and rapidly across multiple groups and requires using many processes. 
One component of the incident response plan is preparation.  This information sharing 
identifies current risks and potential issues.  The U.S. Department of Energy Sandia National 
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Lab has developed a threat model focused on energy (Mateski et al., 2012).  This model focuses 
on the threat and the attackers.   It evaluates threats across two major category groups, 
commitment, and resources.  These groups are broken down into subcomponents: 
• Commitment 
o Intensity – Diligence and perseverance to reach a goal 
o Stealth – higher secrecy reduces the defender’s countermeasures 
o Time – More time spent on an attack increases potential devastation 
• Resources 
o Technical Personnel – Number of skilled personnel increases capability  
o Knowledge – Higher specialized knowledge increases capability 
o Access – Infiltration of systems whether technical, insider, or coercion 
2.6 Exercising the Incident Response Plan: NERC GridEx 
Bulk electric system utilities are required to exercise their incident response plan annually 
for many facilities and at least once every three years for every facility (NERC, 2019c).  From 
private discussions, most organizations use a standard cybersecurity incident response plan for 
all of their applicable facilities.  When performing these exercises, each utility is required to 
follow their plan and identify deviations taken from the plan, identify lessons learned from the 
exercise, and develop and implement plans to address the lessons learned. 
NERC has recognized that to respond to a cybersecurity event effectively, and companies 
must practice for the event.  In addition to exercises run by individual utilities, NERC has 
performed four large-scale national exercises biennially, known as GridEx or the Grid Security 
Exercise. November 2019 marks the fifth incarnation of GridEx.   
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The initial exercise included 64 utilities, Reliability Coordinators, and Regional Entities 
in 2011, along with 19 government representatives.  Participation has grown massively.  In 2017 
during GridEx IV, participation grew to include 238 power grid participants and 202 federal, 
state, and provincial teams (NERC, 2018a).  In addition to utility participation, an executive 
tabletop exercise is held that includes utility CEOs and U.S. agencies, including the White House 
National Security Council, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Defense, and National Security Agency.   
GridEx III in 2015 simulated a continent-wide coordinated cybersecurity and physical 
security attacks with national scenario development performed by E-ISAC and CIPC with 
regional planning and exercise response managed by Reliability Coordinators. The incidents start 
slowly and build until the maximum effect is reached at the end of exercise day one, followed by 
recovery to sustainable operations on day two.   Having led teams that included developing the 
scenarios, I have observed that the objective is to maximize learning capability using a set of 
reasonable events that includes considering historical events. The exercise scope excludes high-
impact low-frequency events such as electromagnetic pulse and military attacks.  Further, it is a 
simulation and does not involve shutting off power. This approach has continued through GridEx 
V. 
The public version of the GridEx III final report included two groups of 
recommendations based on observations from the exercise that relates to this study.  One 




Organizations should review documentation that describes their internal 
information-sharing processes in the context of a large-scale event. This will 
enhance current situation awareness of staff at system operations, field locations, 
security, and other business areas. Documentation should be examined to identify 
opportunities to align incident response by different parts of the organization. 
The right information needs to be collected and shared during a large-scale event to maintain 
situational awareness, both within individual organizations and across organizations. 
 The second related recommendation states  
Review the various tools and reporting processes used by the industry to identify 
opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the information 
sharing process. 
There are numerous methods to share information, with some being mandatory.  These 
include reporting requirements to E-ISAC and the Department of Energy and within the 
operations for sharing between Reliability Coordinators.  Duplicate information and regulatory 
requirements can slow down the reporting of initial information.  These tools need to be 
simplified and coordinated to ensure that the right people receive consistent information 
(Diebold et al., 2013). 
 There is little published cybersecurity research performed on whether incident response 
exercises improve an organization or industry’s ability to respond.  Organizations may treat the 
exercise as a minimal item to pass compliance requirements and limit participation.  Resource 
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constraints or a belief that the risk is low due to a belief that attackers only target larger 
organizations may also limit participation (Line, Zand, Stringhini, & Kemmerer, 2014). 
2.7 Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a technique used for studying causal models 
simultaneously in psychometric research.  Two versions are commonly used.  Both versions of 
SEM are second-generation multivariate statistical analysis techniques.  First-generation 
techniques include exploratory tools such as cluster analysis and exploratory factor analysis and 
confirmatory tools such as multiple regression and logistic regression.  Second-generation tools 
include covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) and partial least squares 
structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) (Joseph F. Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014; Lowry 
& Gaskin, 2014).   
These techniques are ideal for research where measurements cannot be directly taken but 
are instead inferred from other variables.  Latent variables are unmeasured variables that are 
estimated using a linear combination of measured variables (Bentler & Weeks, 1980).   
CB-SEM, also known as factor-based SEM, uses the maximum likelihood approach to 
minimize the difference between the estimated and observed covariance matrices (Astrachan, 
Patel, & Wanzenried, 2014).  To do this, the variance of each measured variable includes the 
common variance shared with other variables in the measurement model and the unique variance 
consisting of specific variance and error (J. Hair, Hult, Ringle, Sarstedt, & Thiele, 2017).   
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PLS-SEM differs from CB-SEM in that PLS-SEM focuses on variance.   A challenge of 
PLS-SEM is that multicollinearity, which is expected when combining factors that are measuring 
the same latent variable, tends to either overestimate or underestimate path coefficients resulting 
in false or false negatives.  To overcome this, the consistent PLS algorithm (PLSc) calculates the 
reliability coefficient ρA and uses this value to correct for attenuation before performing ordinary 
least squares.  When used with normally distributed data, PLSc reduced the likelihood of false-
positive errors in exchange for an increase in the likelihood of false-negative errors (Sarstedt, 
Hair, Ringle, Thiele, & Gudergan, 2016).     
A study of the differences tested the typical reasons one approach was chosen over 
another using Monte Carlo simulation (Reinartz, Haenlein, & Henseler, 2009).  This study 
identified that while PLS-SEM makes no assumptions regarding distribution, CB-SEM is also 
robust to non-normal distributions.  PLS-SEM does not suffer from identification and 
convergence problems.  However, CB-SEM only rarely suffers from these problems.  PLS-SEM 
is more appropriate than CB-SEM for small samples as sample populations of about 100 can 
obtain a reasonable result and is often more appropriate for sample sizes of less than 250.  Based 
on the sample size, this study used PLS-SEM for data analysis. 
2.8 Applications of PLS-SEM 
PLS-SEM has been widely used in causal studies using structural equation modeling.  No 
studies were identified that focused on organizational preparation for a cybersecurity incident. 
Incident response is a component of cybersecurity.  A computer security study of behavior 
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reviewed 430 university students concerning protection motivation, social bond theory, 
awareness, and anti-malware protection (Berthevas, 2018).  The relationship between self-
assessment of controls, cloud security, and cloud-related business performance was established 
using PLS-SEM (Au, Fung, & Tses, 2016).  A study of 183 bank employees identified 
relationships between information security awareness programs, employees’ intent for compliant 
behavior, perceived level of monitoring, and actual compliant behavior (Bauer & Bernroider, 
2015).   
Safety and loss prevention is another related concept.  One study established several 
relationships between safety and health rules, safety procedures, first aid support and training, 
organizational safety support, and occupational hazard prevention (Kaynak, Toklu, Elci, & 
Toklu, 2016).  Another safety study established relationships across eight latent variables to 
identify factors influencing safe workplace behavior (Hald, 2018). 
PLS-SEM has also been used to address organizational climate.  A study of 264 nurses 
found that factors such as autonomy and control of the work environment improved perception, 
whereas burnout reduced perception and safety climate required special attention as an 
opportunity to improve the environment (dos Santos Alves, da Silva, & de Brito Guirardello, 
2017).  A small study in Malaysia surveyed 74 people identified that management commitment, 
safety training, and safety rules and procedures were related to safety behavior (Subramaniam, 
Hassana, Mohd. Zin, Sri Ramalu, & Shamsudin, 2016).  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 This study evaluates a set of human factors necessary for an incident response plan in the 
electric sector.  A hypothesized causal model based on the literature review is tested using a set 
of factors represented by latent variables and indicators.  The model is analyzed using partial 
least squares analysis structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). 
3.1 Summary of Selected Methodology  
The process used to collect and analyze data involved multiple tools and techniques 
includes the following steps:   
1. Identify a proposed research model, hypotheses, and associated measured variables 
2. Collection of data via survey instrument 
3. Analyze collected measured data for skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s alpha 
4. Identify a causal path model using partial least squares structural equation modeling 
(PLS-SEM) for model validation 
Step 1 involves developing a set of measured variables and associated questions to be 
analyzed by personnel with the responsibility to respond to a power grid cybersecurity incident 
and operate the power grid during an incident.  These variables were based on the five groups of 
topics identified in the literature review. Each evaluated statement addressed a separate point 
identified in the literature. 
Step 2 involves promoting and circulating the questions to personnel in the electric sector 
using a Likert style survey.  The collected data included 29 measured variables addressing five 
sets of ideas represented by latent variables documented in the literature review. 
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Step 3 involves analyzing the collected survey data to identify the actual relationships 
and associated factors that describe the relationships using principal component analysis.  These 
relationships may differ from the original proposed model.   
Step 4 involves applying PLS-SEM to the collected data to verify the causal model. 
3.2 Proposed Research Model and Hypotheses 
This research focuses on a set of factors necessary for a successful incident response 
plan.  The selected factors were based on areas emphasized by the electric sector through work 
by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).  These areas of focus include 
information sharing, situational awareness, incident response exercises, and their impact on 
incident response planning.   
The following hypotheses are proposed to test the structural relationships among the 
model constructs.  
H1: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived situational awareness confidence. 
H2: Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant effect on 
the perceived incident response plan adequacy. 
H3: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on the 
perceived incident response plan adequacy. 
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H4: Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on the 
perceived incident response plan adequacy. 
 The tests for the hypotheses are performed using the structural model shown in Figure 5 
using the variables shown in Table 3   
 
Figure 5 Structural Model 
Table 3 Latent Variables 
Variable Type  Description 
EX Exogenous Latent Incident Response Exercise Learning 
SH Exogenous Latent Information Sharing Quality 
SA Endogenous Latent Situational Awareness Confidence 
PL Endogenous Latent Incident Response Plan Adequacy 



















The overall research model, including the identified indicators, also referred to as 
measured variables, is shown in Figure 6. 
3.3 Survey Instrument 
A set of questions was developed and distributed to personnel in the electric sector that 
would be involved in some manner during a cybersecurity incident.  These surveys were 
distributed to participants at various industry meetings, primarily meetings related to critical 
infrastructure security, and through emails using purchased email lists.   
The survey contained six sections and a total of 31 questions.  The first four sections 
included the factors evaluated in the model, incident response exercise learning, information 
sharing quality, situational awareness confidence, and incident response plan adequacy.  The 
fifth section address perceived readiness for a cybersecurity incident and is not used here.  The 





Figure 6 Proposed Research Model 
Respondents evaluated the statement associated with each indicator variable via a Likert 
scale with the range of:  Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral, Somewhat 
Agree, Agree, and Strongly Agree.  The survey was distributed via the web using Qualtrics® 
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software and in paper form.  The electronic survey instrument, which includes additional 
questions not used in this model, is shown in Appendix 2. 
There are specific regulations in NERC Reliability Standard CIP-011 (NERC, 2019c)that 
requires “ procedure(s) for protecting and securely handling BES Cyber System Information, 
including storage, transit, and use.”  BES Cyber System Information is defined as (NERC, 
2019a);  
Information about the BES Cyber System that could be used to gain unauthorized access 
or pose a security threat to the BES Cyber System. BES Cyber System Information does 
not include individual pieces of information that by themselves do not pose a threat or 
could not be used to allow unauthorized access to BES Cyber Systems, such as, but not 
limited to, device names, individual IP addresses without context, ESP names, or policy 
statements. Examples of BES Cyber System Information may include, but are not limited 
to, security procedures or security information about BES Cyber Systems, Physical 
Access Control Systems, and Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems that is not 
publicly available and could be used to allow unauthorized access or unauthorized 
distribution; collections of network addresses; and network topology of the BES Cyber 
System. 
  
The survey was carefully constructed not to ask questions related to BES Cyber System 
Information and privately reviewed to ensure no infringement.  Further, all information was 
collected anonymously by the survey tool, not through de-identification, but instead by non-
collection.  Finally, extremely limited demographic information was collected to ensure no 
potential reverse identification of respondents.  Anonymity was assured in survey 
announcements.   
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3.4 Study Variables 
3.4.1 Structural Model 
Table 3 identifies four latent variables to assess the structural model.  Figure 6 shows the 
structural model.   
3.4.2 Incident Response Exercise Learning Measurement Model 
Table 4 identifies five measurements surveyed that assesses the incident response 
exercise learning latent variable.  Figure 7 shows the measurement model.  Incident response 
exercise learning is an exogenous latent variable with indicators related to this study that may be 
tested during an exercise.   
 
Figure 7 Incident Response Exercise Learning Measurement Model 
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Table 4 Incident Response Exercise Learned Indicators 
Indicator  Variable 
Type 
Dimension Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree) 
(References related to the exercise statement) 
EX1 Measured Adequate Exercise 
Design 
Our team performs incident response exercises that test how well 
information is shared between teams. (NERC, 2012, 2014, 
2016d) 
EX2 Measured Lessons Learned 
Captured 
After an exercise, we carefully reviews and documents the 
lessons learned. (NERC, 2019c) 
EX3 Measured Information 
Sharing During 
Exercise 
Our exercises effectively test the sharing of information. (Diebold 
et al., 2013; NERC, 2016d) 
EX4 Measured Exercise 
Situational 
Awareness 
Our exercise effectively test the ability of teams to develop a 
shared situational awareness of events. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; 
NERC, 2016d) 
EX5 Measured Exercise Incident 
Command 
Our exercises effectively exercise the incident command structure 
and support staff to ensure clear responsibility and authority. 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008) 
 
3.4.3 Information Sharing Quality Measurement Model 
Table 5 identifies five measurements to survey that assesses the incident sharing quality 
exercise learning latent variable.  Figure 8 shows the measurement model.  The measurement 
objectives highlight the organization’s ability to collect and share information needed to prevent 
a cybersecurity incident and respond to an incident.  While the focus is on incident response, 





 Figure 8 Information Sharing Quality Measurement Model  
Table 5 Information Sharing Quality Indicators 
Indicator  Variable 
Type 
Dimension Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree) 
SH1 Measured External 
Information 
Collection 
Our team gets appropriate information from industry sources 
to recognize risks, threats, and vulnerabilities to our system  
(Diebold et al., 2013) 
SH2 Measured External 
Information 
Actionability 
Our team can take effective action using security information 
we receive from external sources, such as E-ISAC. (Diebold et 
al., 2013) 
SH3 Measured Outbound 
Information 
Sharing 
Our team shares security information that we have with our 
partners such as E-ISAC and the Reliability Coordinator 
(Diebold et al., 2013) 
SH4 Measured Clear 
Communication  
Our team shares security information effectively between 
teams and with incident response leaders in a standardized 
format. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008) 
SH5 Measured People with 
Correct Skills and 
Access  
Our team shares security information to the correct personnel 





3.4.4 Situational Awareness Confidence Measurement Model 
Table 6 identifies five measurements to survey that assesses the situational awareness 
confidence latent variable.  Figure 9 shows the measurement model.  The measurement 
objectives highlight the ideas of Endsley’s model (2012) of situational awareness, which is based 
around perception, comprehension, and projection.  The indicators target a shared situation 
awareness viewpoint, based on the idea that a cybersecurity incident response team and not 
individuals respond to an incident.   
 
Figure 9 Situational Awareness Confidence Measurement Model 
3.4.5 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Measurement Model 
Table 7 identifies six measurements to survey that assesses the situational awareness 
confidence latent variable.  Figure 10 shows the measurement model.  The measurement 
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objectives highlight that adequate skilled people, appropriate tools, and resources are necessary 
to respond to an incident.  Additionally, the questions address confidence in the plan to detect, 
contain, and eradicate an intrusion into the network and to appropriately address various types of 
events with different impacts. 
Table 6 Situational Awareness Confidence Indicators 
Indicator  Variable 
Type 
Dimension Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree) 
SA1 Measured Shared Situational 
Perception 
Our organization is unable to assess and understand security 
issues as they happen allowing the situation to deteriorate. 
(reverse encoded question) (US-Canada Power System Outage 
Task Force, 2004) 
SA2 Measured Shared Situational 
Comprehension 
Our organization has the ability to develop a strong shared 
comprehension of the situation that is free of conflicts. (Kaber 
& Endsley, 1998) 
SA3 Measured Organizational 
Projection 
Our team would struggle to forecast what could happen next 
during an incident.  (reverse encoded question) (D'Amico et al., 
2005) 
SA4 Measured Situational Risk 
Awareness 
Our team has the appropriate skills and training to respond to 
most incidents that could be identified. (Webb et al., 2014) 
SA5 Measured Organizational 
Comprehension 
under Stress 
Our team is able to effectively communicate and receive 
information from disparate sources and draw effective 
conclusions during an incident. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) 
 
3.4.6 Summarized Survey Statements and Indicators 
Table 8 presents a summarized version of the statements evaluated by respondents for 





Figure 10 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Measurement Model  
Table 7 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Indicators 
Indicator  Variable 
Type 
Dimension Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree) 
PL1 Measured Flexibility Our team’s incident response plan is flexible and able to deal 
with a wide variety of cyber-attacks. (West-Brown et al., 2003) 
PL2 Measured Processes to Detect 
an Intrusion 
Our team understands how it would detect an intrusion in a 
timely manner when it occurs using the tools available. 
(Cichonski et al., 2012) 
PL3 Measured Processes to 
Contain an 
Intrusion 
Our team is able to detect an intrusion in a timely manner when 
it occurs using the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012) 
PL4 Measured Process to 
Eradicate an 
Intrusion 
Our team has planned how to eliminate an intrusion or 
malware. (Cichonski et al., 2012)   
PL5 Measured Designed for 
Various Event 
Types/Impacts 
Our team knows how to adjust and adapt plans for both small 
and large scale cyber-attacks  (NERC, 2019c) 
PL6 Measured Cyber Kill Chain Our team’s incident response plan considers the various stages 
of an attack from initial intrusion through the attack that could 




3.4.7 Demographics, Information Protection, and Data Privacy 
Demographic information that could be used to identify individuals or companies could 
place companies at risk either through the audit processes or investigations if a cybersecurity 
incident later occurs.  Additionally, information such as the IP address of the respondent cannot 
be maintained. While limiting certain types of analysis that could be performed, it is a necessary 
limitation on the study. 
Demographic data collected includes the type of company, which included investor-
owned utilities, public power companies, and cooperative power companies.  The self-identified 
role during a cybersecurity incident was also asked. 
3.5 Procedures 
3.5.1 Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval 
 The survey instrument was reviewed and determined to be exempt by the University of 
Central Florida Institutional Review Board.  A copy of this determination is in Appendix A.  The 
survey presented am All persons responding to the survey did so voluntarily.   
3.5.2 Anonymity 
Due to the nature of the industry, anonymity was considered a paramount priority due to 
the nature of the regulations the industry operates under, specifically including reliability 
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standard CIP-011-2 (NERC, 2019c) addressing Bulk Electric System Cyber System Information 
(BCSI).  All questions were carefully worded not to include questions related to BCSI.  No 
opportunity was given to provide information on the electronic survey that could disclose 
anonymity. 
3.5.3 Participant Recruitment 
Volunteers were recruited using various methods.  The recruiting approach used public 
and or personal invitations at electric sector meetings, including: 
• NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee  
• Florida Reliability Coordinating Council Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Subcommittee 
• Reliability First Infrastructure Protection Committee 
• NERC Grid Security Conference 
• Indiana Electric Cooperatives Technical Committee 
• Illinois Electric Cooperatives Technical Committee 
• NRECA TechAdvantage Conference 
• SANS Industrial Control Systems Conference 
As many of these conferences specifically focused on power grid cybersecurity and 
therefore included personnel with companies pre-disposed to good security practices, two 
targeted mailing lists were used to invite additional participants.  A total of 229 complete and 
usable surveys were collected.  Due to the method of recruitment, it is impossible to determine 




Table 8 Summarized Surveys Statement for Indicators and Latent Variables 
Variable Variable 
Type 
Dimension Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree) 
SH Exogenous 
Latent 
Information Sharing Quality 
SH1 Measured External Information 
Collection 
Our team gets appropriate information from industry sources to recognize risks, 
threats, and vulnerabilities to our system  (Diebold et al., 2013) 
SH2 Measured External Information 
Actionability 
Our team can take effective action using security information we receive from 
external sources, such as E-ISAC. (Diebold et al., 2013) 
SH3 Measured Outbound 
Information Sharing 
Our team shares security information that we have with our partners such as E-
ISAC and the Reliability Coordinator (Diebold et al., 2013) 
SH4 Measured Clear 
Communication  
Our team shares security information effectively between teams and with 
incident response leaders in a standardized format. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008) 
SH5 Measured People with Correct 
Skills and Access  
Our team shares security information to the correct personnel that can make 
effective use of the information. (Mateski et al., 2012) 
SA Endogenous 
Latent 
Situational Awareness Confidence 
SA1 Measured Shared Situational 
Perception 
Our organization is unable to assess and understand security issues as they 
happen allowing the situation to deteriorate. (reverse encoded question) (US-
Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004) 
SA2 Measured Shared Situational 
Comprehension 
Our organization has the ability to develop a strong shared comprehension of the 
situation that is free of conflicts. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998) 
SA3 Measured Organizational 
Projection 
Our team would struggle to forecast what could happen next during an incident. 
(reverse encoded question) (D'Amico et al., 2005) 
SA4 Measured Situational Risk 
Awareness 
Our team has the appropriate skills and training to respond to most incidents that 
could be identified. (Webb et al., 2014) 
SA5 Measured Organizational 
Comprehension 
under Stress 
Our team is able to effectively communicate and receive information from 




Incident Response Exercise Learning 
EX1 Measured Adequate Exercise 
Design 
Our team performs incident response exercises that test how well information is 
shared between teams. (NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d) 
EX2 Measured Lessons Learned 
Captured 
After an exercise, we carefully reviews and documents the lessons learned. 
(NERC, 2019c) 
EX3 Measured Information Sharing 
During Exercise 
Our exercises effectively test the sharing of information. (Diebold et al., 2013; 
NERC, 2016d) 
EX4 Measured Exercise 
Situational 
Awareness 
Our exercise effectively test the ability of teams to develop a shared situational 
awareness of events. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; NERC, 2016d) 
EX5 Measured Exercise Incident 
Command 
Our exercises effectively exercise the incident command structure and support 




Incident Response Plan Adequacy 
PL1 Measured Flexibility Our team’s incident response plan is flexible and able to deal with a wide variety 
of cyber-attacks. (West-Brown et al., 2003) 
PL2 Measured Processes to Detect 
an Intrusion 
Our team understands how it would detect an intrusion in a timely manner when 
it occurs using the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012) 
PL3 Measured Processes to Contain 
an Intrusion 
Our team is able to detect an intrusion in a timely manner when it occurs using 
the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012) 
PL4 Measured Process to Eradicate 
an Intrusion 
Our team has planned how to eliminate an intrusion or malware. (Cichonski et 
al., 2012)   
PL5 Measured Designed for 
Various Event 
Types/Impacts 
Our team knows how to adjust and adapt plans for both small and large scale 
cyber-attacks  (NERC, 2019c) 
PL6 Measured Cyber Kill Chain Our team’s incident response plan considers the various stages of an attack from 




3.5.4 Review of Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are analyzed to determine internal consistency and normality.  The 
reviewed statistics include range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s 
alpha.  As the format of the survey is a Likert scale, it is expected the range for all variables, 
excluding categorical demographic data, will be between 1-7.  IBM SPSS® Version 26 is used to 
perform these tests. 
The means and standard deviation identify the average response and extent of deviation 
of the responses assuming a normally distributed response.  Skewness is a measure of symmetry 
or the distortion of the data set with a value of 0, indicating the data matches a normal curve 
exactly.  High kurtosis indicates that the data has heavy tails, with the extreme case being a 
uniform distribution.  Significant skewness and kurtosis indicate the data is not normally 
distributed.  Skewness and kurtosis should both be less than 2.0 if the data are normally 
distributed (Cameron, 2004).  Normality is preferred, but not explicitly required for PLS-SEM 
(Joseph F. Hair et al., 2014).   
Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, or a measure of how consistently 
individuals rate items in a scale.   The data is further reviewed to consider the effect of 
eliminating any single term to identify if removal of a variable increases the alpha to identify if 
the responses to the statement are inconsistent with the remaining terms (Vaske, Beaman, & 
Sponarski, 2017).  While Cronbach’s alpha will also be calculated as part of the PLS-SEM 
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analysis, it is separately performed first to ensure that the collected data is appropriate for 
analysis. 
Inter-item correlation is an alternative measure of internal consistency.  Inter-item 
correlation indicates an overall view of how well the items are correlated.  inter-item correlations 
above 0.4 indicate the items address the same characteristic (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).   
Excessive collinearity is an additional concern. Pearson’s coefficient identifies if a linear 
relationship is present between two values based on normally distributed variables (Akoglu, 
2018).  Values above 0.85 indicate a higher likelihood of issues related to collinearity. 
3.5.5 PLS-SEM Model  
SmartPLS 3 is used to identify and test the final model using PLS-SEM using the 
consistent PLS model.  Calculations are initially performed on the outer model using the factor 
weighting scheme and then followed up with the path weighting scheme for evaluation of the 
final model.  Bootstrapping is used to identify statistical significance and p-values.  Complete 
bootstrapping with 5000 samples was selected.  
The first set of targets is related to the outer measurement model.  There are four sets of 
tests to evaluate the model.  Indicator reliability is measured using the outer loadings in the 
model.  Loadings need to be adequate to add value to the model.  Hair et al. (2019) have identified 
that loadings above 0.7 are preferred, and loadings above 0.5 are appropriate for use in the model.    
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Indicator reliability is assessed using the outer loadings (indicator loadings) that represent 
the simple correlations between measured variables and the associated latent variable.  The 
preferred minimum of 0.7 comes from the fact that a loading of 0.708 is representative of 50% of 
an item’s variance (Joseph F Hair, Risher, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2019).  However, it is common to 
find a few outer loadings in a measurement model to be less than 0.7.  Indicators with loadings 
less than 0.4 should be dropped (Hulland, 1999).   
Three different measures are commonly used to measure internal consistency (Joseph F 
Hair et al., 2019).  Each of these are related and has targets between 0.7 and 0.9, with values 
above 0.95 considered representative of redundant items.  Cronbach’s alpha is considered a 
conservative measure of reliability, whereas composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) is considered 
a liberal measure of reliability.  The difference is that composite reliability is weighted based on 
the indicator’s loadings.  The ρA measure (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015)is used as a compromise 
between Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).   
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE).  An 
acceptable AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is 
explained (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  These assessments are summarized in Table 9. 
The second set of assessments relates to the structural model include collinearity, model 





Table 9 Summary of the Measurement Model Validity Assessments 




Outer loadings  
 
> 0.7 Preferred 
> 0.5 Acceptable 




Cronbach’s alpha  0.7 – 0.9 Hair et al. (2019) 
ρA 0.7 – 0.9 Hair et al. (2019) 










< 0.85 Preferred 
0.85 - 0.90 Acceptable 
 
Hair et al. (2019) 
 
Collinearity is present when the predictor variables are correlated and can bias model 
results and is measured using variance inflation factors (VIF).  Values above 5.0 indicate 
collinearity issues, and values between 3.0 and 5.0 indicate concern.  Ideally, values should be 
below or at least near 3.0 (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).   
For model fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 for endogenous variables should 
have values of at least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered substantial, moderate, and 
weak while an R2 value (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  R2 greater than 0.9 indicates an overfit that 
includes noise in the model. For this model, the incident response plan adequacy has a strong 
coefficient of determination, while situational awareness confidence has a moderate coefficient 
of determination.  
Model fit in covariance-based SEM is often analyzed using the standardized root mean 
square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between the empirical correlation 
matrix and the model implied matrix model implied.  Hu and Bentler (1999) defined a cutoff of 
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0.8 for covariance-based SEM models.  No defined value is widely accepted, though the 
acceptable value for PLS-SEM would likely be higher than 0.8. (Joseph F. Hair et al., 2014) 
Another journal article takes the position that a cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable 
(Henseler, Hubona, & Ray, 2016).  For this analysis, an SRMR will be reported, but no 
applicable target value will be applied. 
 Cohen (1988) identified the f2 statistic to measure effect sizes with at least 0.02 for a 
small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large effect. 
The capability of model prediction can be evaluated using the blindfolding procedure.  
Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion evaluates the capability of the model to predict endogenous latent 
variables.  Q2 values greater than zero indicates predictive value for the model path, while values 
of less than zero indicate the path does not have predictive value.  




Table 10 Summary of the Structural Model Validity Assessments 





< 3 Preferred 
3 – 5 Acceptable 
Hair et al. (2019) 
Model fit R2 > 0.90 Overfit 
> 0.75 Substantial 
> 0.50 Moderate 
> 0.25 Weak 
Hair et al. (2019) 
 SRMR <0.08 Preferred Henseler, Hubona, 
& Ray (2016) 
Effect size f2 > 0.02 Small 
> 0.15 Medium 
> 0.35 Large  
Cohen (1988) 
Path Coefficient for 
direct and indirect 
effects 
p-value  < 0.05 
 












CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
Research findings include the responses, demographics, data, and associated descriptive 
statistical results from the survey are reported.  Path analysis using partial least squares analysis 
is used, which bases estimates on explaining the maximum amount of variance.   
4.2 Survey Results 
Respondents evaluated the 21 survey statements previously shown in Table 8 on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) through neutral (4) to strongly agree (7).  
Two questions were reverse encoded in the language, and those responses were inverted after 
data collection.  Each of these statements was treated as measured variables and associated with 
a hypothesized latent variable.  The survey also included eight additional statements related to 
perceived organizational readiness, but those statements are not used in this analysis. 
Data were filtered using three factors to remove any unengaged responses using three 
techniques. First, at least 28 of the original 29 survey statements needed to be evaluated and 
responses.  Second, rejected responses included those with a standard deviation across all 
evaluated statements of less than 0.4 either before or after inverting the reverse encoded 
questions.  Third, data excluded cases where the respondent did not recognize that the reverse 
encoded questions. As shown in Table 11, 229 surveys are used in the analysis.  Six respondents 
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that omitted evaluating one statement had the omitted response imputed by inspection of the 
associated evaluated statements.   
Table 11 Survey Responses 
Web-based responses during e-mail campaign 41 
 






Total surveys received 263 
 
Abandoned surveys with at least one and less than 28 of 29 statements 




All 29 statements evaluated 231 
 
Non-engaged responses (standard deviation < 0.4) or clearly did not recognize 




28 statements evaluated with one imputed response 6 
 
Surveys analyzed in the study 229 
 
 
A portion of the emails sent during the email campaign used a targeted mailing service 
provided by a media company that provided response rate information.  They reported that 5.7% 
of emails were opened, and the survey link was clicked on in 0.4% of email messages.  Overall, 
64 surveys were opened and started resulting in 41 surveys completed during the email 
campaign.   
Demographic questions included asking the role in the company and whether the 
company was an investor-owned utility, municipal utility, or cooperative.  As can be seen in 
Tables 12 and 13, responses from electric cooperatives are over-represented in the responses, and 
personnel that directly operated the power grid is under-represented.   
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Table 12 Role Played in Incident Response 
Role Respondents 
Power Grid Manager 12 
Power Grid Operator 10 
Cyber Incident Response Manager 33 
Cyber Incident Responder 40 
Overall Management 73 
Other 59 
No response 2 
 
 
Table 13 Type of Company  
Type of Company Respondents 
Investor owner utility 55 
Electric cooperative 126 
Municipal or other government electric power company 42 
No Response 6 
  
 
Many of the surveys were completed during industry events such as conferences and 
meetings.  To ensure anonymity was maintained, no records were kept of specific invitations.  
Some invitations were general announcements, and others were direct invitations.   
While it is not possible to fully characterize a typical respondent that completed the 
survey at an industry event, it is possible to draw some summary conclusions about those that 
participated.  The groups of participants can be divided into two types.  There are two typical 
participant type.  These descriptions are clearly generalizations based on the observation of 
participants in meetings. 
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The first group are those that participated at NERC and other large meetings.  These 
participants may have from all regions of mainland United States and the Provinces of Canada, 
but do not typically include representatives of Baja California, the Territories of Canada, or the 
U.S. Territories.  Respondents are more likely to be male.  They typically included motivated 
personnel with responsibility either for cybersecurity or regulatory compliance.  In general, 
respondents are likely to at least ten years of professional and management experience and 
predominantly male.   
Participation at other meetings were predominantly from a single type of company or 
region of the country. They were more likely to be individual contributors, though managers 
would be represented as well.  They likely had at least five years of experience, more likely to be 
technically focused and more likely male. 
While survey participation was clearly not viral, it is known that invitations were passed 
along by others to members of the Canadian Electricity Association, and at least four cooperative 
associations, and at least two NERC regions. At least one vendor in the industry also shared 
invitations with their customers. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics - Normality, Internal Consistency, and Collinearity  
Normality is measured using skewness and kurtosis. All variables are normally 
distributed, with absolute values less than 2.0 (Cameron, 2004), as shown in Table 14.  
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Cronbach’s alpha is a test of internal consistency that measures if the respondents as a 
group responded consistently (Vaske et al., 2017), as shown in Table 14.  Values above 0.7 
demonstrate internal consistency, while values above 0.9 indicate potential collinearity due to 
redundancy (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  Both incident response plan adequacy and incident 
response exercise lessons learned have values above 0.9.  Cronbach’s alpha concerns will be 
addressed during model evaluation by removing indicator variables.   
Inter-item correlations, another test of internal consistency, indicates that the items 
address the same characteristic with all values above the 0.4 minimum (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).   
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics 
 Range Mean 
Standard 













EX2 1-7 5.34 1.597 -1.080 0.323 0.900 
EX3 1-7 4.76 1.587 -0.555 -0.639 0.890 
EX4 1-7 4.79 1.621 -0.598 -0.642 0.896 
EX5 1-7 4.82 1.697 -0.593 -0.705 0.919 




SH2 1-7 5.14 1.507 -0.589 -0.453 0.781 
SH3 1-7 4.72 1.626 -0.744 -0.263 0.813 
SH4 1-7 4.31 1.593 -0.419 -0.793 0.804 
SH5 1-7 5.20 1.442 -0.968 0.534 0.818 




SA2 1-7 4.80 1.295 -0.620 0.120 0.785 
SA3 1-7 4.58 1.495 -0.289 -0.792 0.791 
SA4 1-7 5.24 1.414 -0.968 0.535 0.773 
SA5 1-7 5.08 1.283 -0.960 0.763 0.780 




PL2 1-7 5.25 1.319 -1.127 1.160 0.886 
PL3 1-7 5.27 1.365 -1.014 0.500 0.883 
PL4 2-7 5.36 1.396 -1.079 0.583 0.887 
PL5 1-7 4.97 1.360 -0.983 0.660 0.883 





Pearson’s coefficients for all measured variables in each of the hypothesized latent 
variables have a significant p-value of 0.000, indicating correlation is present.  Pearson’s 
coefficient identifies if a linear relationship is present between two values for normally 
distributed variables (Akoglu, 2018).  The bivariate Pearson’s coefficient for each group of 
variables is shown in Tables 15-18, demonstrating that a linear relationship is present for all 
variables in each latent variable.  
Table 15 Pearson's Correlation for Incident Response Exercise Learning  
 
 EX1 EX2 EX3 EX4 EX5 
Adequate Exercise Design 
(EX1) 
Pearson Correlation 1         
Sig. (2-tailed)      
Lessons Learned Captured 
(EX2) 
Pearson Correlation 0.736 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000         
Exercise Information Sharing 
(EX3) 
Pearson Correlation 0.791 0.779 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000       
Exercise Situational 
Awareness (EX4) 
Pearson Correlation 0.628 0.713 0.787 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Exercise Incident Command 
(EX5) 
Pearson Correlation 0.554 0.621 0.639 0.764 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  
 
Table 16 Pearson's Correlation for Information Sharing Quality 
 
 SH1 SH2 SH3 SH4 SH5 
External Information 
Collection (SH1) 
Pearson Correlation 1     
Sig. (2-tailed)      
External Information 
Actionability (SH2) 
Pearson Correlation 0.673 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
 
   
Outbound Information 
Sharing (SH3) 
Pearson Correlation 0.442 0.553 1   





Pearson Correlation 0.426 0.556 0.533 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
People with Correct Skills 
and Access (SH5)  
Pearson Correlation 0.468 0.478 0.434 0.533 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 17 Pearson's Correlation for Situational Awareness Confidence  
 
 SA1 SA2 SA3 SA4 SA5 
External Information 
Collection (SA1) 
Pearson Correlation 1         
Sig. (2-tailed)      
Shared Situational 
Comprehension (SA2) 
Pearson Correlation 0.440 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000         
Organizational 
Projection (SA3) 
Pearson Correlation 0.503 0.456 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000       
Situational Risk 
Awareness (SA4) 
Pearson Correlation 0.479 0.452 0.486 1   




      
Pearson Correlation 0.399 0.577 0.418 0.601 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
  





Table 18 Pearson's Correlation for Incident Response Plan Adequacy  
 
 PL1 PL2 PL3 PL4 PL5 PL6 
Flexibility (PL1) Pearson Correlation 1      
Sig. (2-tailed)        
Processes to Detect 
an Intrusion (PL2) 
Pearson Correlation .626 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000       
Processes to Contain 
an Intrusion (PL3) 
Pearson Correlation .654 .716 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000      
Process to Eradicate 
an Intrusion (PL4)  
Pearson Correlation .628 .570 .698 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Designed for Various 
Event Types (PL5)  
Pearson Correlation .631 .597 .601 .624 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Cyber Kill Chain 
(PL6) 
Pearson Correlation .581 .567 .494 .534 .686 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000   
 
 
4.4 Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) Model 
The hypothesized structural causal path model was identified from the survey data 




Figure 11 Hypothesized PLS-SEM Causal Model 
The associated hypotheses for the model include: 
• H1: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived situational awareness confidence 
• H2: Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant 
effect on perceived incident response plan adequacy 
• H3: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived incident response plan adequacy 
• H4: Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived incident response plan adequacy 
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The hypothesized identified model represents two exogenous variables representing 
information sharing quality (SH) and incident response exercise lessons learned (EX). The model 
also includes two endogenous variables representing situational awareness confidence (SA) and 
incident response plan adequacy (PL).   
Thee variables were discarded during model analysis.: 
• EX3 removed to address excess collinearity and to reduce overall Cronbach’s 
alpha 
• PL5 removed to address excess collinearity and to reduce overall Cronbach’s 
alpha.   
• SA1 removed to address low average variance extracted 
SmartPLS version 3 is used to perform the PLS analysis.  The basic PLS algorithm used includes 
(SmartPLS):  
1. Outer approximation of the latent variable scores, 
2. Estimation of the inner weights, 
3. Inner approximation of the latent variable scores 
4. Estimation of the outer weights 
The consistent PLS (PLSc) algorithm adds a correction to address for inconsistency in 
PLS estimates for reflexive variables by adding a correction for path coefficients, inter-construct 
correlations, and indicator loading.  The PLSc algorithm extends the base PLS algorithm by 
adding additional steps (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015): 
5. Estimate reliability 
6. Correct for attenuation 
7. Estimate consistent coefficients 
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The data is analyzed using the PLSc algorithm.  Where needed, bootstrapping with the complete 
bootstrapping option with 1000 iterations is used to provide p-values for tests where a p-value is 
needed.   
4.5 Model Results  
Structural equation models include two submodels, an inner structural model and an outer 
measurement model.  The measurement identifies the linear relationship between the measured 
indicator variables and the associated latent variables.  The structural model identifies the linear 
relationship between endogenous and exogenous latent variables (Wong, 2013).  Note that all 
results shown except where noted reflect the final model, including only statistically significant 
paths and indicators retained in the final model. 
4.5.1 Measurement Model Analysis 
The indicators being analyzed are reflexive, which was previously confirmed by 
Cronbach’s alpha and mean inter-item correlation.  When using reflexive variables, PLS-SEM 
factors to consider include indicator reliability, internal consistency, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). 
Indicator reliability is assessed using the outer loadings (indicator loadings) that represent 
the simple correlations between measured variables and the associated latent variable.  The 
preferred minimum is 0.7.  However, it is common to find a few outer loadings in a measurement 
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model to be less than 0.7.  Indicators with loadings less than 0.4 should be dropped (Hulland, 
1999).  Table 19 shows the outer loadings with 13 measured variables having a loading above 
0.7, and the remaining five measured variables have a loading above 0.6.   
Three related calculations measure internal consistency and reliability, including 
Cronbach’s alpha, ρA, and composite reliability, with targets between 0.7 and 0.9 with values 
above 0.95 indicative of redundant items (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  Cronbach’s alpha is 
considered a conservative measure of reliability, whereas composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) 
is considered a liberal measure of reliability.  The ρA measure used to adjust results in the 
consistent PLS algorithm  (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015) compromises between Cronbach’s alpha 
and composite reliability (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  All variables have values for each of these 
measures between 0.7 and 0.9, as shown in Table 20. 
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE).  An 
acceptable AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is 
explained (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  The average variance is at or above 0.5 for all variables.  














External Information Collection (SA1) 0.654 
External Information Actionability (SH2) 0.678 
Outbound Information Sharing (SH3) 0.666 
Clear Communication (SH4) 0.724 






Shared Situational Perception (SA1)  Discarded 
Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2) 0.641 
Organizational Projection (SA3) 0.630 
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4) 0.757 





Adequate Exercise Design (EX1) 0.822 
Lessons Learned Captured (EX2) 0.766 
Exercise Information Sharing (EX3)  Discarded 
Exercise Situational Awareness (EX4) 0.856 
Exercise Incident Command (EX5) 0.825 
 
Incident Response 
Plan Adequacy  
(PL) 
Flexibility (PL1) 0.840 
Processes to Detect an Intrusion (PL2) 0.744 
Processes to Contain an Intrusion (PL3) 0.741 
Process to Eradicate an Intrusion (PL4) 0.776 
Designed for Various Event Types/Impacts (PL5)  Discarded 
Cyber Kill Chain (PL6) 0.786 
 
 








Incident Response Exercise Learning 0.890 0.891 0.890 0.669 
Information Sharing Quality 0.839 0.842 0.836 0.507 
Situational Awareness Confidence 0.799 0.809 0.801 0.504 





Discriminant validity is assessed using the heterotrait-monotrait ratio.  Values above either 0.85 
for more distinct measures or 0.90 for less distinct measures are suggested as limits.  As this is a 
theoretical model using related reflexive factors, 0.9 would be considered a targeted limit 
acceptable, and 0.85 is the preferred limit.  All values are below 0.85.  A summary of these 
targeted values and values for the structural model addressed next is shown in Table 21.  
Table 21 Discriminant Validity HTMT Ratios 










Information Sharing Quality 0.709   
Situational Awareness Confidence 0.646 0.804  
Incident Response Plan Adequacy 0.726 0.767 0.832 
 
 
4.5.2 Structural Model Analysis 
Items to assess in the structural model include collinearity, model fit, effect size, and the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients. Collinearity is present when the predictor 
variables are correlated and can bias model results and is measured using variance inflation 
factors (VIF).  Values above 5.0 indicate collinearity issues, and values between 3.0 and 5.0 
indicate concern (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  Table 22 shows that one measurement model 
variable, EX4, has a VIF value of 3.15, with the remaining values below 3.0.  Table 23 shows 
that all structural model VIF values are below 3.0. 
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Table 22 Measurement Model Collinearity Tests using VIF 
  VIF 
External Information Collection (SA1) 1.934 
External Information Actionability (SH2) 2.349 
Outbound Information Sharing (SH3) 1.647 
Clear Communication (SH4) 1.800 
People with Correct Skills and Access (SH5) 1.585 
 
Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2) 1.646 
Organizational Projection (SA3) 1.446 
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4) 1.756 
Organizational Comprehension under Stress (SA5) 1.923 
 
Adequate Exercise Design (EX1) 2.303 
Lessons Learned Captured (EX2) 2.858 
Exercise Situational Awareness (EX4) 3.150 
Exercise Incident Command (EX5) 2.481 
 
Flexibility (PL1) 2.253 
Processes to Detect an Intrusion (PL2) 2.422 
Processes to Contain an Intrusion (PL3) 2.887 
Process to Eradicate an Intrusion (PL4) 2.262 
Cyber Kill Chain (PL6) 1.752 
 
 






Incident Response Plan Adequacy  1.732 
Information Sharing Quality 1.000  
Situational Awareness Confidence  1.732 
 
 
For model fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 for endogenous variables should 
have values of at least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered substantial, moderate, and 
weak while an R2 value (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).  R2 greater than 0.9 indicates an overfit that 
includes noise in the model. For this model, the incident response plan adequacy has a 
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substantial coefficient of determination, while situational awareness confidence has a moderate 
coefficient of determination, as shown in Table 24. Model fit may also be analyzed using the 
standardized root mean square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between 
the empirical correlation matrix and the model implied matrix model implied.  While no cutoff A 
cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable (Henseler et al., 2016).  The estimated model had 
an SRMR of 0.061. 
Table 24 Coefficient of Determination for Endogenous Variables 
  R2 R2 Adjusted 
Incident Response Plan Adequacy 0.754 0.752 
Situational Awareness Confidence 0.653 0.652 
 
 
The effect size is measured using the f2 statistic.  Cohen (1988) identified effect sizes for 
the f2 statistic of at least 0.02 for a small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large 
effect.  Incident response exercise lessons learned to incident response plan adequacy has a 
medium effect.  Table 25 shows that incident response exercise lessons learned to incident 
response plan adequacy has a medium effect, and information sharing quality to situational 
awareness and situational awareness to incident response plan adequacy each has a large effect. 
Table 25 Effect Size for Model Paths 
 f2 
Incident Response Exercise Learning → Incident Response Plan Adequacy 0.247 
Information Sharing Quality → Situational Awareness Confidence 1.883 





Once the model is developed, the capability of model prediction can be evaluated using 
the blindfolding procedure.  Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion evaluates the capability of the model to 
predict endogenous latent variables.  Q2 values greater than zero indicates predictive value for 
the model path, while values of less than zero indicate the path does not have predictive value.   
Incident response planning has a Q2 value of 0.378, and situational awareness confidence has a 
Q2 value of 0.267, indicating that the exogenous variables have predictive relevance on the 
associated endogenous variables. For PLS-SEM, the cross-validated redundancy approach to 
measuring the Q2 value for each of the endogenous variables is used (Joe F Hair, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2011; Shanmugapriya & Subramanian, 2016).    
4.5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
The selected causal model meets are validity assessments for both the measurement model and 
the structural model, as shown in Tables 26-27.  All assessments are acceptable. 
Table 26 Summary of the Measurement Assessment Results 




Outer loadings  
 
> 0.7 Preferred 
> 0.5 Acceptable 
13 variables preferred 
5 variables acceptable 




Cronbach’s alpha  0.7 – 0.9 All variables in range Hair et al. (2019) 
ρA 0.7 – 0.9 All variables in range Hair et al. (2019) 
Composite 
reliability 











< 0.85 Preferred 






Hair et al. (2019) 
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Table 27 Summary of the Structural Model Assessment Results 
 Measurement Target Model results Supporting 
Literature 
Collinearity Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
< 3 Preferred 
3 – 5 Acceptable 
17 variables preferred 
1 variable acceptable 
Hair et al. (2019) 
Model fit R2 > 0.90 Overfit 
> 0.75 Substantial 
> 0.50 Moderate 
> 0.25 Weak 
No variables overfit 
1 variable substantial 
1 variable moderate 
No variables weak 
Hair et al. (2019) 
 SRMR <0.08 Preferred  0.061 Henseler, Hubona, 
& Ray (2016); 
Hair et al. (2019) 
Effect size f2 > 0.02 Small 
> 0.15 Medium 
> 0.35 Large  
None 
1 in range 
2 in range 
Cohen (1988) 
Path Coefficient 
for direct and 
indirect effects 
p-value  < 0.05 
 
All coefficients in 
range 
(all variables ≤ 0.001) 





Q2 >0 All endogenous 
variables above 0 






The overall objective of this approach is to identify a significant set of paths in a causal model 
that addresses an incident response plan's adequacy.  The structural model with results shown in 
Table 26 is significant, with P-values of 0.001 or less for both direct and indirect effects.   
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Deviation T statistic P-Value 
H1 Information Sharing Quality  
→ Situational Awareness Confidence 
0.808 0.808 0.052 15.505 0.000 
H2 Situational Awareness Confidence  
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy 
0.622 0.626 0.100 6.247 0.000 
H3 Information Sharing Quality  
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy 
0.547 0.568 0.167 0.754 0.451 
H4 Incident Response Exercise Learning  
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy 
0.324 0.319 0.099 3.271 0.001 
 Results shown for H1, H2, and H4 are calculated after removal of H3 from model 
 
Hypothesis testing for the model is shown in Table 29.  The final model is shown in Figure 12.   
Table 29 Hypothesis Testing Results 
 Hypothesis Result 
H1 Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived situational awareness confidence 
Accepted 
H2 Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant effect 
on perceived incident response plan adequacy 
Accepted 
H3 Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on 
perceived incident response plan adequacy 
Rejected 
H4 Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on 

































People with Correct 












































**p   0.001  
Figure 12 PLS-SEM Causal Model 
4.5.4 Importance Performance Map Analysis (IMPA) 
With a demonstrated model, additional analysis can be performed to identify improvement 
opportunities.  Importance-performance map analysis is an analytical technique that identifies 
where to focus future work to gain the most improvement in the target latent variable.  IPMA is 
used to identify predecessors that have a low performance but high importance. A one-unit point 
Increasing the performance of the predecessor by 1 point increases the performance of target by 
the total effect size of the predecessor (Farooq, Salam, Fayolle, Jaafar, & Ayupp, 2018; Ringle & 
Sarstedt, 2016).  In this case, improvements to incident response plan adequacy would likely be 
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the targeted improvement.  SmartPLS reports performance in a standardized manner on the Y-
axis and the total effect size of a 1-point increase on the X-axis.  As can be seen from Figure 13 
and Table 30, the most valuable area to focus on to improve incident response plan adequacy is 
situational awareness confidence.  Increasing the overall situational awareness confidence score 
by 1 point would increase the incident response plan adequacy by 0.542 points.   
In addition to reviewing the map at the latent variable, the impact of measured variables 
can also be mapped.  These results for the most important latent variable, situational awareness, 
are also reported in Table 31.  Within situational awareness confidence, variable SA5 
representing organizational comprehension under stress has the most impact, with each 1-point 
increase in the measured variable increasing perceived incident response plan adequacy by 0.16 
points. 
  



















Incident Response Exercise Learning 0.310 67.177 
Situational Awareness Confidence 0.542 65.816 
Information Sharing Quality 0.334 66.122 
 
 






Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2) 0.118 59.68 
Organizational Projection (SA3) 0.138 70.670 
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4) 0.160 68.049 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This research focused on finding a causal path model to understand the relationships 
between perceived readiness for a cybersecurity incident considering the adequacy of the 
incident response plan; incident response exercises such as the national GridEx; the perceived 
quality of information sharing within the electric sector related to cybersecurity risks; and the 
perceived confidence of situational awareness that would be gained during an incident. This 
section discusses what can be learned from these results, the implications of the study, and 
recommendations for future research. 
5.1 Discussion 
The industry focuses on cybersecurity to ensure grid reliability and resiliency.   The 
electric sector has numerous teams that actively perform research and education, including the 
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, the Electric Power Research Institute, 
private organizations such as the SANS Industrial Control Systems team, and the Department of 
Energy National Labs.  While extensive research is performed on cybersecurity, no similar study 
was identified to review how the industry personnel perceive incident response plans.  
This study identified that personnel in the electric sector perceive that information 
sharing quality has a statistically significant causal impact on situational awareness confidence 
and situational awareness has a significant impact on incident response plan adequacy for 
cybersecurity incidents in the electric sector.  Further, learning from incident response exercises 
has a significant effect on incident response planning.   
77 
 
These findings demonstrate that the efforts to improve information sharing and 
situational awareness by the electric sector have been beneficial.  These efforts should continue 
to be enhanced by the electric sector and by other critical infrastructure information sharing and 
analysis centers. These additional efforts should target improving the situational risk confidence 
of personnel, especially in the area of situational risk assessment.   
The study also verifies that incident response exercises such as GridEx are perceived to 
improve incident response planning.  The exercise requires tremendous effort within NERC, E-
ISAC, and electric sector companies.  Based on the increasing participation in exercises, the 
industry recognizes the benefits(NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d, 2018a). 
5.1.1 Information Must Be in Context to Be Useful 
A direct path from information sharing to incident response planning was hypothesized as 
so much emphasis is placed on information sharing in the industry.  In retrospect, the non-
significance of this path and instead significance of the indirect path through situational 
awareness is satisfying.  Information is critical, but it does not improve the incident response 
planning process.  Instead, it is the ability to analyze and place the information in context that 
matters.  Blindly reacting to information without this context and an understanding of its 
importance can lead to suboptimal real-time decisions.   
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5.1.2 Low Response Rates 
It is difficult to obtain responses to this type of survey due to real and perceived 
limitations on responding to a survey that addresses cybersecurity.  Controlling information is 
essential as reconnaissance is the first step in any attack.  Each piece of information publicly 
available that shows a weakness guides the attackers.  This survey was carefully constructed to 
not infringe on the regulatory requirements.  The methods used to recruit volunteers resulted in 
an overrepresentation of cooperatives.   
One topic of this research is information sharing.  However, one challenge of this survey 
was an unwillingness to participate in the survey.  Response rates were extremely low for 
emailed surveys, about 0.3%, requiring the use of direct recruitment.  As personal interviews 
were not a survey technique and those that declined never agreed to participate, no records were 
kept.  From an anecdotal viewpoint, one reason people declined to participate was that they were 
not authorized to discuss anything that may disclose security vulnerabilities.   
The target audience of the survey and the difficulty in obtaining responses resulted in 
overall low variance in the data collected, confounding the results of the survey.  This can be 
seen in the low standard deviation of responses in Table 14, Descriptive Statistics, and also in the 
high internal reliability for each latent variable in Table 20, Internal Reliability, and Converging 
Validity Statistics.  This low variance may be a result of consistent shared views on the topics by 
those participating in the survey.  Alternatively, it may have resulted from respondents believing 
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they must respond a certain way should the information ever become public, or they may 
experience career issues.  These are just two possible causes for the consistent viewpoints.  
5.1.3 Information Sharing: Public Good vs. Public Right to Know 
The industry writes and enforces the Reliability Standards for the bulk power system, and 
the regulations are generally approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  In 
February 2018, NERC issued a $2.7 million penalty (NERC, 2018b) for a significant violation of 
the information protection requirement against Pacific Gas and Electric (Smith, 2019) under a 
prior version of Reliability Standard CIP-003 (NERC, 2019c). Typically, the company names of 
violators are not released as part of the penalty notice by NERC or FERC.  In this case, the 
company was identified by journalists.   
This balance of public good, denying critical information to attackers, industry learning 
from violations, and the public right to know needs to be considered.  This obligation needs to be 
considered by both government agencies and the power grid companies.  FERC Commissioner 
Glick in a statement summarized some of the factors needing to be balanced (Glick, 2019) 
• Lack of transparency in the NERC Notice of Penalty process 
• Disclosure of company names would act as a further deterrent to violations 
• Need to ensure that information useful to an attacker is not released 
While the company name has previously not been identified, the specific violations were 
identified.  Companies may, and from personal observation, frequently use this information to 
improve their programs.  A joint FERC and NERC white paper in response to this review would 
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eliminate detailed violation information and replace this information with the name of the 
violator, the penalty amount, and the NERC CIP Reliability Standards violated.  The specific 
requirements in Standards would not be released. Otherwise, the attackers would know specific 
weaknesses to exploit. 
5.1.4 Benefits of Confidential Information Sharing 
While it is critical for power grid companies not to disclose vulnerabilities, the sharing of 
information allows all companies to work together to improve security and, therefore electric 
reliability.  This ability to share makes it possible for the industry as a whole to improve 
capabilities.  Other industries have seen similar successes related to safety.  NASA, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, through its Aviation Safety Reporting System, provides 
confidential reporting and enforcement immunity to those that report incidents (NASA, 2011).  
Factors in the success of the system include trust, anonymity, and confidentiality.  The 
information collected is used to identify and address safety issues (O'Leary & Chappell, 1996).  
This system is highly successful, with 94,302 reports received in 2017 (Hooey, 2018).  By 
providing immunity, confidentiality, and trust to controllers, pilots, and companies for 
information reported, NASA has created a system that encourages reporting of events and 
therefore increases safety.  
Other industries have various reporting systems that have enhanced safety.  The 
MedWatch Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting System performs this role in the 
health care sector.  The voluntary information from the public and mandatory information from 
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manufacturers provides a basis for identifying safety risks from products  (Craigle, 2007; Han, 
Ball, Pamer, Altman, & Proestel, 2017).  Ahmad (2003) demonstrates the success of the program 
by listing a dozen different regulatory actions taken by the Food and Drug Administration.  
The electric sector collects some of this information through the Electricity Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center using their private portal.  However, personal observation is that 
only a limited amount of voluntary information gets reported.  To make the best use of this tool, 
increasing the amount of information and useful tools to automate the analysis of information 
once adequate information is available will improve electric sector capabilities.  For 
electronically collected data, this task is currently performed using the Cybersecurity Risk 
Information Sharing Program (CRISP), where suitable information is available to analyze.  
Department of Energy specialists perform this analysis (Department of Energy, 2018).  Increased 
speed identifying events is critical.  Just as important is identifying risks to the power grid.  The 
lack of information sharing due to fears of risks becoming public both impedes attackers and the 
companies.   
5.1.5 Lack of History for Cyberattacks with Power Outages  
 Cyberattacks are frequent in information technology, including the business side of the 
electric companies.  Ransomware has been the prevalent high-profile attack in 2017-2019.  In 
2019, more than 70 cities have suffered from ransomware (Brumfield, 2019).  Utilities have been 
targeted as well, with one ransomware attack in Johannesburg disrupting the ability for residents 
to pre-purchase power (Cimpanu, 2019; Manos, 2017; Walton, 2018).  However, there have only 
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been two attacks that have disrupted the power grid, with both occurring in Ukraine (Assante et 
al., 2016; Assante et al., 2017).  The respondents to the survey were communicating their beliefs 
for a potential power grid cyberattack, not an actual cyberattack.   
 So far, cyberattacks on the power grid have been high-impact low-frequency events.  
NERC and the Department of Energy studied three types of these events: coordinated cyber and 
physical attack, pandemic illness, and geomagnetic and electromagnetic events while 
acknowledging there are others such as natural disasters, meteor strikes, and war (North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation & Department of Energy, 2010).  Since experience is 
limited or non-existent in the current environment, other techniques are required.  The most 
damaging effect would be a complete collapse of the power grid.    
One study technique focuses on identifying different scenarios that could cause a 
collapse, hardening those weak points, and taking steps to mitigate these risks.  For example, a 
physical attack on as few as nine strategically placed substations could collapse the power grid 
under the right circumstances (Tweed, 2014).   An additional reliability standard, CIP-014, was 
added to address this risk (NERC, 2019c).   Geomagnetic storms require different types of 
protections for the power grid, but also focus on vulnerabilities and weak points.  The biggest 
mitigation for both of these events is engineering resilience into the system.  Additional power 
grid resilience contains the impact of an event. Reducing this impact simplifies response and 
recovery. 
 Systems and technology are not the only risk.  This study focused on people.  A severe 
curtailment of people and resources, such as a pandemic event, would challenge the electric 
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sector. The power grid depends on a large number of people with specialized skill sets such as 
power engineers, linemen, and system operators.  It is incumbent on electric utilities to 
understand who the most critical staff are and ensure they and their families get the most 
protection.  People will place family before the power grid. 
Further, cyberattacks take advantage of opportunity due to loss of response capability. 
The simplest example is the increase in fraudulent fund-raising emails following an event such as 
a hurricane.  In the power grid, nation-states take steps to be implanted inside of other countries’ 
power grids should an attack be needed.  These capabilities will likely remain unused unless a 
specific need arises. Resilience, the ability to recover from an event, must consider people as 
well as processes and technology. 
5.2 Study Limitations 
In addition to the low response rate previously discussed, the predominant limitation is 
the homogeneity of the study.  The study population was primarily collected through survey 
invitations at meetings due to the low email response rate.  As a result, motivated professionals, 
especially managers, were the primary respondents.  The sample is somewhat biased and resulted 
in shared, consistent views. Homoscedasticity can lead to imprecise estimates and sensitivity to 
the choice of the indicators used (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, & Mitnik, 2009).  This homoscedasticity 
is also seen in the Cronbach’s alpha statistics shown in Table 14, Descriptive Statistics.  Shifting 
this study from specific research in the electric sector to the broader group of companies that use 
industrial control systems could address the low response rate and homoscedasticity.   
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Restricting the sample to the electric sector and focusing so heavily on the power grid 
also limits the ability to extend the results of the study to other technology sectors.  However, the 
electric sector is unique in the manner it chooses to respond to cybersecurity incidents.  Whether 
or not this uniqueness in its approach is needed can be debated.  This debate will become even 
more important as more sectors take a regulatory approach to information security.   
Incident response is just one component of cybersecurity.  The Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2018) also 
addresses risk identification, system protection, attack detection, and recovery.  By focusing on a 
single component, the study is only applicable to incident response.  Pairing these results with 
additional studies that address the remaining framework domains would add context and 
contribute to a fully functional method to improve cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. 
5.3 Future Research 
The present study researched specific areas that have been targeted by the industry for 
improvement.  Future work may need to address other areas such as the cybersecurity culture in 
organizations and the workforce in general.  Safety research has demonstrated the importance of  
safety culture (Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006; Noort, Reader, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2016; 
Shirali, Shekari, & Angali, 2016).  Cybersecurity culture is an extension of these well-proven 
ideas (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Flores, Antonsen, & Ekstedt, 2014).   
Another potential research area is to identify how incident response exercises can more 
effectively build confidence for cybersecurity personnel that would be responding to a power 
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grid incident.  Some in the industry are of the opinion that many smaller companies see these 
tabletop exercises more as a regulatory checkbox than a learning process.  To effectively 
exercise, these responders need to be pushed beyond the response plan and challenge their 
capabilities, such as in a GridEx exercise.  Through these challenges, people learn how to adapt 
to the specific event, communicate effectively, and make appropriate decisions. 
The recruitment methods and survey statements focused on power grid personnel that 
would respond to a cybersecurity incident.  While these teams focus on the technical aspects, a 
similar study of system operations personnel responsible for operating the power grid could shed 
insights.  For example, how well do these operators have the ability to recognize a cybersecurity 
and understand how an incident would affect their operations?  Do they distinguish how a 
cybersecurity incident is different from other significant power grid events?  Do they trust their 
company’s cybersecurity capabilities if an incident occurs? 
While the data that was collected is inadequate to perform a multigroup analysis based on 
demographics, another potential approach may be to perform predictive tree analysis.  This 
technique identifies individuals with similar views as clusters and analyzes the difference in the 
clusters using automatic indicator detector analysis (Wan & Shasky, 2012).   
While response is critical, recovery back to the normal state, or at least to a condition that 
is as near normal as possible, is the end goal.  A potential follow-up would be to adapt this type 
of survey towards recovery and focus more on the people who would be responsible for bringing 
the attacked portion of the power grid back to life.  Significant work has been done related to 
weather events and blackouts (Duffey & Ha, 2012; Sun, Liu, & Liu, 2011).  Understanding the 
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confidence that the personnel have towards power grid recovery during a cybersecurity event 
could highlight additional areas of improvement.  A critical aspect of this study would be the 
higher distrust of information provided by control systems in a cybersecurity event than a 
weather event. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results of this study revealed that personnel in the electric sector believe that 
information sharing quality has an impact on situational awareness confidence, and situational 
awareness has an impact on incident response plan adequacy for cybersecurity incidents in the 
electric sector.  Further, learning from incident response exercises has an effect on incident 
response planning.   
These findings demonstrate that the efforts by the electric sector to enhance information 
sharing and situational awareness by NERC and the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center have been beneficial and that these efforts should continue to be enhanced by the electric 
sector and by other critical infrastructure information sharing and analysis centers. These 
additional efforts are recommended to focus on improving the situational risk confidence of 
personnel and that these efforts need to focus on situational risk assessment and training.   
The most important aspect of this model is that it is not limited to cyberattacks.  The 
framework developed tying incident response to situational awareness, information sharing, and 
event exercises would be appropriate to extend to other event types and event response 
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disciplines.  The indicators would need to be customized to the discipline, and no preexisting 
framework is available.   
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by presenting a model that ties together 
the human factors in power grid incident response.  Through this model, the industry can identify 
where and how to direct future efforts to improve people’s capabilities to respond to a 
cyberattack.  While the model developed focused in this limited area, the ideas are readily 
extensible to other related domains. 
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